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CASE COMMENTS

Income Taxation-Basis for Depletion Allowance
Taxpayer, a mining and development company, entered into a
written contract with lessee of coal mines, the lessee having entered
into a long-term lease with owner of coal lands to mine the coal,
whereby taxpayer would auger mine in certain areas of lessee's
leasehold. Taxpayer worked as an independent contractor, using
his own equipment and machinery which was movable and usuable
elsewhere. Title to all coal mined remained in the lessee, all coal
was delivered to the lessee, and taxpayer retained no right to sell
coal elsewhere. Taxpayer received a set price per ton for coal
delivered to lessee, subject to adjustments for general wage increases, and lessee had the right to cancel the lease only if the
operation became unprofitable or if taxpayer defaulted. Tax
Court held that taxpayer did not have a sufficient "economic interest' to entitle him to a depletion allowance based on amounts
received for mining coal under the contract since taxpayer looked
for his payment to the personal covenant of lessee and not to
severance and sale of coal, and there was reasonable expectancy
that cancellation clause might be enforced. Held, reversed. Taxpayer had sufficient "economic interest" entitling him to a depletion allowance, as his right to mine was not subject to control or
termination by the lessee save for default or unprofitability. Elm
Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1963).
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that there shall
be, in case of mines, oil and gas wells, timber and other natural
resources, a "reasonable allowance for depletion" in computing
taxable income. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 611 (a). The Code does
not, however, define who is entitled to a depletion allowance.
This information is found in TnnE. REG. § 1.611-1(b)(1) (1960),
which requires a person to have an "economic interest' in the mineral in place before claiming a depletion allowance. This ambiguous phrase was first coined in Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551
(1933), vhen the court stated that a taxpayer had an "economic
interest", entitling him to a depletion allowance, when (1) he had
acquired an interest in the mineral in place by investment, and
(2) his income from the legal relationship was derived from
extraction and sale of the mineral, to which he must look for a
return of his capital.
The Treasury Regulations incorporated language similar to that
of the Palmer case, supra, and then included a statement that a
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person does not have an "economic interest" merely because
through a contractual relation he possesses a mere "economic
or pecuniary advantage" derived from production. TREAs. REG.
§ 1.611-1(b) (1) (1960). The phrase "economic advantage" orginated in Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938), when
the Court said that it was not sufficient for taxpayer to claim a
depletion allowance, when it had no interest in the mineral in
place, simply because through its contracts it had gained an
"economic advantage" from the production of the mineral. The
term "economic interest" and "economic advantage" are of no assistance in determining whether the necessary relationship exists
to give a depletion allowance. They merely describe the result
once the basic determination has been completed. 18 N.Y.U. INST.
ON FED. TAX 517 (1960). Therefore, a history of court decisions
concerning depletion allowance is necessary to determine why
the court has arrived at its present decision.
A depletion allowance was allowed in the earliest cases as long
as the taxpayer had a property right and interest in the mineral
which had been depleted by extraction and sale during the year.
Lynch v. Alworth Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364 (1925). In accord
with this broad rule, lessees of oil producing properties, by reserving from an assignment one-eight of all oil produced, bad an
"economic interest" sufficient to allow a depletion allowance. The
taxpayer's right to depletion did not depend on ownership or on
any other form of legal interest in the land. It was enough if he
had a contractual right to share in the mineral produced by the
leasing transaction. Palmer v. Bender, supra.
Depletion allowance problems in recent years have been primarily concerned with mining companies claiming depletion allowances because of their contractual relationship with the owners
or lessees of mines to mine the coal. In 1950 the General Counsel's
office promulgated a ruling concerning depletion allowance to
contractors. Coal stripping and mining companies were entitled
to a depletion allowance when (1) the contract is not terminable
at will or upon nominal notice by either party, and (2) the coal
stripper must rely wholly or partially upon extraction and sale of
the coal for his compensation or right to receive compensation.
G.C.M. 26290, 1950-1 Cum. Bui.L. 42. A contract is not terminable
within the meaning of this ruling if it cannot be terminated within
a year or provides for only suspension of the work. The failure
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of the courts to agree on the proper emphasis to be given the two
parts of the ruling, and their further failure to recognize factual
distinctions in the cases have created problems in the application
of the ruling.
In Commissioner v. Gregory Run Coal Co., 212 F.2d 252 (4th
Cir. 1954), a strip miner entered into a contract with the lessee
of coal mines whereby the stripper was to mine the coal with his
own labor and deliver the coal to the lessee who furnished the
equipment and machinery. The contract was terminable by the
lessee upon thirty days notice and the stripper was to receive
compensation fixed by the selling price of coal, adjustable to
changes in the market. The court held that the stripper was entitled to a depletion allowance because his right to compensation
was completely dependent upon extraction and sale of the salable
product. An "economic interest" was also found in a taxpayer who
transferred its mines to another party and reserved the exclusive
right to mine the coal for the other party. The taxpayer received
a set price per ton of coal mined, subject to increase or decrease
by labor costs, and either party could terminate on ninety days
notice. Taxpayer's right was dependent solely upon extraction and
delivery of the coal, and this was sufficient to give it an "economic
interest" in the coal in place. Weirton Ice & Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1956).
In Commissioner v. Hamill Coal Corp., 239 F.2d 347 (4th Cir.
1956), the lessee of certain coal mines entered into a contract
with a mining company to mine the coal. The contract could be
terminated by either party on ninety days notice and the company
was paid a certain amount per ton, subject to increase if wages
were increased but not dependent on fluctuations of market price.
The company did furnish some large and expensive equipment
for the mining. The court allowed the company a depletion allowance not on the basis of the terminability of the contract nor
on the amount received being dependent on market conditions, but
on the fact that the company had made large investments in roads
and other buildings and could look only to amounts paid under
the contract for a return of its investment. Thus, these three cases
of the Fourth Circuit all allowed depletion allowance regardless
of the ruling by the General Counsel's office.
The Tax Court has complied with the General Counsels ruling.
The court denied a depletion allowance when strip miners were
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to receive an amount not dependent upon the market price nor
the price received for sale of coal. Morrisdale Coal Mining Co.
v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 208 (1952). The Tax Court, however,
allowed depletion when the stripper looked solely or partly to
the sale of the coal for his remuneration. Rustin v. Commissioner,
19 T.C. 284 (1952). In Stilwell v. United States, 250 F.2d 736 (4th
Cir. 1957), a depletion allowance was given where the price taxpayer received for mining the coal would be modified from time
to time as a result of increases or decreases in the market price
of coal.
The question of whether the taxpayer has a depletable interest
in the mineral in place depends upon the varied incidents of the
contractual relation under which he works. The courts had held
prior to 1959 that the primary test was whether the extractor
looked for his compensation to the severance and sale of the
mineral ("economic interest") or whether his compensation was
dependent upon the personal covenant of those with whom he
had contracted (no "economic interest"). It was only a secondary
test whether the contract was terminable at will or on short notice
by either party. Usibelli v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 539 (9th Cir.
1956).
In 1959, against this background of precedent, the Supreme
Court determined that a most important factor as to whether a
strip miner engaged in strip mining coal by virtue of his contract
with the owner of coal lands was entitled to depletion allowance
depended on whether their contract was terminable without cause
on short notice. Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215 (1959). The
contract in the Parsons case called for the strip miner to receive
a certain amount of money, subject to increases to cover higher
costs for labor and material. All that was necessary to terminate
the oral contract by either party was ten days notice. The strip
miner furnished his own equipment but it was movable and usable
at other sites. The Court held that the strip miner received an
"1economic advantage" and profit from the production of coal but
no interest in the coal in place because (1) the strip miner's
investment was in movable equipment, not in the coal in place,
(2) his investment was recoverable through depreciation, not
depletion, (3) the contract was completely terminable without
cause on short notice, (4) the landowners didn't surrenders any
capital interest in the coal in place, (5) the coal after it was
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mined always belonged to the landowner and the strip miner
could not sell it, (6) the strip miner was not paid any part of
the proceeds from the sale of the coal, but was paid a fixed sum
for each ton mined, and (7) the strip miners looked only to the
landowners for all sums due them under their contracts.
Although the Court in the Parsons case did not specifically
assign one guide-line with a top priority, it twice referred to the
fact that the strip miner's contract was "completely terminable
without cause on short notice". The courts in their later decisions
have laid much emphasis on this point. In United States v. Stallard,
273 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1959), the court held that the most important factor in determining whether the operator was entitled
to a depletion allowance was the terminability of the contract.
The depletion allowance was disallowed because the contract was
terminable on thirty days notice even though the price paid to
the operator for the mining of the coal was geared to the general
market price and the operator had built permanent roads.
In McCall v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1963), the
Parsons case was held to be controlling. The taxpayers were
under contract to mine coal for the lessee of coal mines. The
taxpayers' right to compensation was dependent on the fluctuation
of market price, and the contract was terminable by either party
on thirty days notice. The Tax Court had held in 1956 that the
taxpayer had an "economic interest" in the coal in place and was
entitled to a depletion allowance. McCall v. Commissioner, 27
T.C. 133 (1956). The Fourth Circuit held, however, that collateral
estoppel was inapplicable since the Parsons case constituted a
marked shift in emphasis by the Supreme Court as to circumstances where a depletion allowance could lawfully be allowed.
The court, relying squarely on the Parsons case refused to allow
depletion allowance because of the terminable nature of taxpayer's
interest. Thus, under the same contract, it was held in 1956 by
the Tax Court that taxpayer had an "economic interest", while in
1963, due solely to the change brought about by the Parsons case,
the taxpayer no longer retained this "economic interest".
Other cases disallowing depletion allowance relying on the
terminability factor are Denise Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 271
F.2d 930 (3rd Cir. 1959) (yearly contracts but could be terminated on sixty days notice), Bolling v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 754
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(1962) (contract cancelable upon thirty days notice by either
party), and Desrosiers v. Commissioner, 21 CCH TAx CT. MEM.
264 (1962) (contract terminable by either party on thirty days
notice after the first one hundred twenty days). In Utah Alloy
Ores, Inc. v. Commissioner,33 T.C. 917 (1960), the contracts were
for terms of one year unless the operator failed to work the claim
but depletion was disallowed since a term of one year was not
sufficient to mine the claims to exhaustion. Thus, it would appear
that there must be a reasonable probability that coal will be mined
to exhaustion under the contract before the courts will allow a
depletion allowance to taxpayer mining under the contract.
The Parsons case, supra, laid down seven guide-lines for aid in
interperting an "economic interest". Subsequent decisions have
interpreted the Parsonscase to mean that stripping rights terminable
on minimal notice are not a sufficient interest to support depletion,
and that the factor of terminability should be given top priority in
the court's determination of an "economic interest". In accord with
this interpretation, the court held in the principal case that a
contract conferring the right to terminate the contract only on
grounds of default by the strip miner or lack of profitability to
the lessee was not an agreement terminable at will or on short
notice. The court based its decision almost entirely on terminability as the Parsons case was similar in every instance except
for the limited right of termination. In the future, the courts will
look to the terminability of the contract to determine if the strip
miner has an "economic interest". It would appear that the test
of terminability of a contract to depletion cases may eliminate much
of the vagueness and uncertainty that has previously existed.
Ward Day Stone, Jr.

Income Taxation-Contribution to Employees' Savings Trust
Action for refund of income tax. P sought deduction from gross
income as a business expense money contributed by transfer to
employee savings trust fund. The three year trust, established in
1950, permitted employees to join through wage withholdings with
P matching all contributions equally. Under no circumstance was P
to receive back sums contributed. If his employment was terminated because of death, retirement, disability, or layoff, the em-
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